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Introduction
1 Mexican dictator Porfirio Díaz famously remarked that Mexico’s curse was to be “So far
from God, and so close to the United States.” This saying is a good metaphor for jobs in
Mexico’s retail sector, which, as in the United States, are among the worst jobs. Retail
trade constitutes one of the largest employment sectors in high income countries, as well
as middle-income ones like Mexico. Modern retail  chains generate large quantities of
entry-level jobs,  many of which are low-wage. The sector’s employment patterns and
practices make up an important strand among processes that generate and reproduce
economy-wide inequality. 
2 Retail trade jobs are also emblematic of service work as a whole. Soft skills are needed to
perform adequately even in entry-level positions but these soft skills, while “hired for,”
are expected to be acquired outside the market. The sector (in the United States, Mexico,
and elsewhere) hires a high proportion of women for customer contact positions, relying
upon socialization processes and gender role expectations to access these skills. In so
doing,  it  also does its part in maintaining gender-based hierarchies and occupational
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gender segregation. Also, long hours of operation are common, another feature of in-
person service work. The ways in which modern retailers deploy labor in order to provide
long  opening  hours  have  significant  consequences  for  workers  and  for  inequality.
Weekend and night work are common. Increasingly the competitive model has had the
twin, oftentimes conflicting, goals of cutting labor costs through thin staffing, short and
variable schedules, and low wages, while also seeking to improve customer service and
product quality and variety in order to retain or expand market share. For all of these
reasons, retail work is an ideal window for understanding bad jobs—and what it is that
leads to variation in the quality and characteristics of these jobs.
3 The processes which shape retail job quality are a complex mix of corporate strategy—as
it  evolves  in  response  to  threat  and  opportunity—institutional  frames  for  labor  and
product markets, aspects of the reproductive sphere of society, and worker responses. In
this paper, we explore the role of work-related and non-work related societal institutions
in directly and indirectly affecting retail job quality and its consequences for workers. As
discussed immediately below, the role of societal institutions and norms is best studied
with cross-national comparative studies. We compare the processes that shape retail jobs
in  Mexico  and the  United  States  relying  upon sectoral  field  work  in  both  countries
conducted over the past nine years. Three dimensions of job quality are used as focal
points of comparison: hours of work; compensation structure; and job mobility.
4 The  next  section  addresses  the  framework  for  thinking  about  the  role  of  societal
institutions in a particular sector, why Mexican and US retail job quality can be fruitfully
compared, and the questions we seek to answer. The following sections describe data and
methods and review key institutional differences between Mexico and the US. The main
part of the paper reports findings on three dimensions of job quality. A final section
draws conclusions.
The Role of Societal Institutions
5 We begin with an interest in job quality outcomes and seek to understand the role of
societal institutions and norms in shaping business practices (affecting their decision terms)
regarding the deployment and compensation of labor.  Of course,  jobs are affected by
product market characteristics and corporate strategy—and this is the primary reason for
looking within a particular sector, retail, and broadly similar firms within it–here chain
stores  (big-box  and  otherwise)  in  food  and  consumer  electronics.  Still,  as  is  well
documented, even in a globalized economy nation-level societal institutions and norms
continue to impact job quality outcomes. The literature on varieties of capitalism has
documented this variation at the macroeconomic level (Gallie 2007, Hall and Soskice 2001,
Katz and Darbishire 2000, Whitley 1999).  To fully understand the interrelationships of
markets,  technology,  work  organization,  and  societal  institutions,  a  sector-based
comparative  approach yields  the  richest  information (Bank Muñoz 2008,  Coiling  and
Clark 2002, Royle 2006). Such an approach starts from observed differences in average job
quality and analyzes the contribution of societal institutions to these differences using
sector-specific cross-national comparisons (see Maurice, Sellier and Silvestre 1986 for a
standard-setting study).1 Starting from a micro-level analysis focusing on selected job
characteristics, authors move up to locate jobs within systems of employment and the
latter within a constellation of interacting social and economic spheres. For example,
Baret, Lehndorff and Sparks (2000) examine working time in retail in three European
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countries and Japan and Bosch and Lehndorff (2005) analyze multiple service industries
(including retail) in ten European countries. Bosch and Lehndorff (2005) summarize four
main spheres of influence on work (Gadrey 2000 offers a slightly different formulation
with similar implications):
1. Product market and consumers, including parameters of competition and product market
regulation
2. Management strategies, including corporate governance and technology 
3. The labor market and associated institutions and norms, public policy, customers and
industrial relations
4. The welfare state and gender relations including family structures and taxes and benefits
6 Existing retail sector studies have primarily focused on comparisons across rich countries
(Askenazy et al. 2012, Baret 2000, Carré, et al. 2010, Jany-Catrice and Lehndorff 2005, as
well as those above) and there is much to be learned from comparing business practices
across a broader range of countries. Middle income countries, such as Mexico, have their
national modern retail  chains and discounters as well  as,  increasingly,  foreign-owned
chains. Large, multinational chains—primarily those based in Europe, the United States,
and Japan—act on business practices in middle and low income countries both through
direct investment and through the diffusion of their competitive model. Modern retail
chains in Mexico, as in the US, seek ways to cut labor costs, while seeking to maintain, or
even improve,  service levels  and the quality and variety of  goods that  they provide.
 Hence, it is important to extend cross-national studies of modern retail to countries with
more dissimilar institutions. 
7 We focus here on retail job quality in Mexican and US chains in the modern sector of
retail  in both countries.  Such a sectoral  comparison of  retail  job quality can include
average measures but,  in order to explain how institutions and market forces relate,
detailed case-study work yields the intermediate processes that come into play in such
interactions. 
8 The comparison of US and Mexican retail jobs juxtaposes two very distinct sets of societal
institutions and social norms, on one hand, with modes of retail service that are quite
similar in the two countries, on the other hand—chain supermarkets and convenience
stores  in  food  retail,  and  consumer  electronics  chains.   The  first  set  of  relevant
institutions  for comparison  is  those  with  direct  impact  on  the  workplace;  to  wit,
employment  regulations  and  their  enforcement,  and  the  labor  relations  system.  In
Mexico, weak enforcement of a wide range of labor regulations (Bensusán 2009, Cook
2007) must be taken into account because it mitigates regulatory effects. Second, there
are  institutions  with  direct  labor  supply  impacts  as  well  as  indirect  impact  on  the
workplace.  Buttressing the latter are social norms related to gender roles, family and
leisure time.
9 Prior work has examined the activities of specific multinationals (particularly Wal-Mart)
in  Mexico  (Chavez  2002,  Schwentesius  and  Gómez  2002,  Tilly  2005,  2006)  and  has
summarized the characteristics of Mexican retail jobs (Álvarez and Tilly 2006, Tilly and
Álvarez  2006).  The present  study takes  a  view that  is  broader  than the case  studies
(examining the full range of chain stores in food and electronics), deeper than the job
quality summaries (capturing a wider range of retailer practices and why they vary), and
is comparative. This richer perspective enables us to bring Mexico into the discussion of
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the  variegated  ways  in  which  national  institutions  and  norms  matter  in  job
characteristics.
10 In comparing the relative roles of institutions, norms, and markets, as well as resulting
business practices, within retail, it is essential to take into account the context of national
labor  markets  and  economies  that  differ  across  the  two  countries.  The  majority  of
Mexican workers face a far thinner set of work alternatives and income supports than US
workers (de la Garza and Salas 2006).  While movement to informal retail  is  always a
possibility, informal retail employment (as opposed to retail entrepreneurship) yields low
incomes relative to formal work.
11 We address the following questions:
• To what extent can we explain national differences in retail jobs as resulting from
institutional differences? 
• Which institutions seem to be most important in explaining which differences in job
characteristics? 
• Within the parameters set by institutional and market differences, how much discretion is
left for companies to adopt different policies and practices? 
12 Guided by these questions, we explore in depth three main dimensions of job quality:
schedules;  compensation  structure;  and  mobility.  They  display  similarities  and
differences which we summarize as follows. Regarding hours of work, the most striking
contrast is the heavy use of part-time in the US and its very thin use by Mexican retailers.
Regarding compensation,  retailers in both countries experiment with varied forms of
incentive  pay,  but  display  divergent  practices  regarding  pay  ladders,  with  Mexican
retailers showing more pay inequality than US ones. Regarding mobility patterns, we find
higher  average  turnover  rates  in  Mexican  than  in  US  retailers.  Moreover,  more
traditional gender roles in Mexico translate into women being more likely to drop out of
the labor market to care for children for extended periods, and less likely to be able to
advance  into  management.  (Gender  differences  are  highly  relevant  because  retail
employment is  disproportionately female in both countries:  a  retail  worker was 1.09
times as likely to be a woman as the average worker in the US in 2007, 1.20 times as likely
in Mexico in 2009 [US Bureau of  Labor Statistics  2012b,  INEGI  2010,  2012])  However,
retailers in both countries share a common tendency toward diminishing reliance on
internal promotion. Within these average patterns, retailers do not behave uniformly and
there is room for individual corporations to diverge from the main trend.
 
Methods
13 In the United States, we conducted case studies at 16 grocery and consumer electronics
chains (regional and national) during 2005–2007, interviewing 195 executives, managers,
and workers and gathering quantitative human resources indicators.2 These quantitative
indicators  provide  a  context  for  information  gathered  in  individual  interviews  and
document  broad  patterns  such  as  pay  scales  across  job  categories.  In  Mexico,  we
conducted  133  interviews  at  20  chains  and  12  small  retail  firms  (in  food,  general
merchandise, clothing, and consumer electronics) located across Mexico in 2003–2004; we
also conducted a three-period longitudinal survey of 91 food retail workers in the state of
Tlaxcala in 2006–2008.  In both countries,  about one-third of interviews fell  into each
occupational  category (US:  30% executives,  30% managers,  40% workers;  Mexico:  31%
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executives, 42% managers, 27% workers). Interviews were tape recorded, transcribed, and
coded  for  qualitative  analysis.  In  all  three  studies  we  asked  about  hours  of  work,
compensation, and work history and job mobility. In the US and earlier Mexican study we
also asked about company operations and the nature of tasks and skills involved in jobs.
Mexican chains were reluctant to participate,  so at  6 of  the Mexican chains we only
succeeded  in  getting  access  at  the  single store  level.  Some  Mexican  executives  and
managers also declined to give certain details, especially about salaries.
14 The US chains follow formats that will be familiar to most readers: Large supermarkets,
big boxes (food and broad-line, electronics-only, office equipment and supplies), smaller
format electronics specialists, and two smaller format food chains (a compact warehouse
store and a large convenience store selling a range of merchandise in addition to food).  
15 The two Mexican studies include a broader range of retail formats than the US study but,
for this analysis, we limit our attention to the Mexican food and electronics chains most
comparable to the US sample. The 2003-04 Mexican sample includes all the same formats
as in the US (except the last two more idiosyncratic formats);  indeed, there are four
chains  representing  “autoservicios”,  big-box  hypermarkets  or  supercenters  that  have
become the dominant retail format in Mexico. This earlier Mexican study includes five
convenience  store  chains,  two  chains  of  intermediate-sized  food  stores,  and  five
department store chains as  well  as  a  range of  other formats  (analysis  of  which falls
outside  the  scope  of  this  study).3 Distinctive  to  Mexico  is  the  fact  that  one  of  the
autoservicio  chains  is  the  government-owned  ISSSTE  chain,  run  by  the  public  sector
workers’ retirement fund (later privatized in 2007). The longitudinal study includes all
the  food-selling  formats.  Pseudonyms  are  used  to  refer  to  both  US  and  Mexican
companies,  except for the ISSSTE stores (whose identity would have been difficult  to
obscure in any case).
16 We also  draw on publicly  available  data  as  appropriate  to  characterize  workers  and
companies in the two countries.
 
Main Institutional Contrasts
17 Clearly  the  two  countries  differ  along  numerous  dimensions  of  political  and  social
institutions. We highlight the institutional features that most directly impact retail work
and that contrast across the two countries. 
 
Hours Regulation, Minimum Wages, and Social Protection Benefits
18 The systems regulating work hours and minimum wage laws contribute, in each country,
to shaping important aspects of work, particularly retail work because of its low wages
and nonstandard hours. US retail environments are shaped by the lack of regulation of
work hours, an hourly minimum wage, and a federal overtime mandated pay premium
over 40 weekly hours. The minimum wage, to which retail entry-level wages are pegged—
slightly above—is low and has declined in real terms (Economic Policy Institute 2010),
standing at 70 percent of its 1968 level in real terms in 2011 (calculated by authors from
US Bureau of Labor Statistics 2012a, US Department of Labor 2012). Key social protection
benefits, such as health insurance and pension, are employer-sponsored and are often not
available  to  part-time  and  casual  workers.  The  possibility  to  establish  sharp  cost
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differentials between full-time and part-time workers directly affects retailers’ staffing
patterns (e.g. most cashiers are part-time) and impacts workers’ experience.
19 There is no universal, public and free, child care system in the US; instead, parents use a
patchwork of private pay services, subsidized child care in centers or family providers,
and informal arrangements (Clawson and Gerstel 2002; Gerstel et al 2002). Therefore a
ready supply of people with caretaking responsibilities, primarily mothers, will seek and
maintain part-time jobs in spite of the limitations which they entail simply to handle
their care responsibilities.
20 Mexico has a longer work week, a daily minimum wage (at the time the research was
conducted), and universal social insurance. Mexico’s full-time work week is 48 hours (six
days  x  eight  hours),  with  overtime  provisions  only  applying  beyond this  point.  The
Mexican minimum wage was until late 20124 set by daily pay, and not hourly pay. Mexican
law also mandates universal social insurance (via employer contributions), though the
level  is  low  and  workers  with  greater  market  power  generally  get  plans  above  the
minimum. Formal sector workers can in principle benefit from subsidized housing and
child care schemes though, in reality, ease of access and availability vary across regions.
 
Collective Bargaining
21 Collective  bargaining can play  a  significant  role  in  affecting job quality.  Unions  and
collective bargaining operate in distinct institutional environments in the two countries,
with consequences for job quality. In the US, with its context of the limited government
role  in  employment  regulation,  collective  bargaining  can  play  a  significant  role  in
affecting benefit access, hours of work, and procedures for promotion. As a result, there
are differences in job quality between unionized and non-unionized retail  jobs,  albeit
differences that have diminished over the past 40 years. Still, collective bargaining affects
relatively few retail workers.
22 Where they exist,  US grocery  unions  have  bargained hard,  showing a  willingness  to
strike, notably in the hard-fought 2003-04 Southern California grocery strike and lockout
(Broder 2003) and retailers have vigorously resisted unionization (Greenhouse 2011). But
US union coverage has fallen significantly over time, so that retail union density was 4.9%
in 2011, reflecting a grocery store unionization rate of 16.7 % (more than twice as high as
the private sector average) along with virtually no union presence in the rest of the
sector (UnionStats 2012). For these reasons, collective bargaining has a limited impact,
not  only  affecting  increasingly  fewer  workers  directly  but  also  having  diminishing
“threat” effect on non-union workplaces.
23 In Mexico, where labor law is, in principle, much more conducive to unionization than US
law, unions have a limited impact.  By law, a petition of 20 workers is sufficient to form a
union, whereas US law requires a majority vote that in practice is typically contested by
employers. In reality, in the retail sector, as in many other sectors, collective bargaining
contracts  consist  overwhelmingly  of  “protection  contracts”  that  affirm  the  benefits
required  by  law  and  specify  wages  and  fringe  benefits  somewhat  above  the  legally
required minima, but block entry by any more militant union (Bouzas and Reyes 2007,
Bouzas and Vega 1999, Tilly and Álvarez 2006). Indeed, Arturo Alcalde (1999, p.73), one of
Mexico’s leading labor law experts, asked rhetorically, “Who knows of a single democratic
union of restaurants, janitors, offices, or retail stores?” Author Tilly (forthcoming), based
on an analysis of Mexican retail contracts, has argued that there is more heterogeneity
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than this statement would suggest, but that the large majority of contracts are essentially
protection contracts.  In our sample,  the only case in which there appears (based on
worker and manager accounts) to be a union committed to serious bargaining is the
government-owned ISSSTE stores. In other chains, unions were absent or had a minimal
footprint. Even where a union was present, workers and even store-level managers were
often unaware of it. Particularly poignant were the comments of three department store
clerks (interviewed jointly) who, unaware they had a union in their store, commented on
what difference a union could make:
Interviewer: Does having a union make a difference?
Employees: They help the worker more. They respect holidays. Without a union,
sometimes we have to work on holidays. With a union, you receive a dinner, a
transportation bonus, and uniforms. You get all the fringe benefits.
24 In Mexico, retail union density was reported at 1.4 percent in 2002 (the most recent year
available; Esquinca and Melgoza 2006), but this percentage (based on a worker survey) is




25 Now, we turn to findings from case studies including field interviews on several  key
dimensions of retail job quality which we found to present the most salient contrasts
between the two countries, contrasts that illustrate most vividly the interplay between
retailers’ competitive strategies on one hand, and national institutions and social norms
governing work as well as the reproductive sphere, on the other hand. These dimensions
are: hours of work, compensation, and career ladders and mobility.
 
Hours of Work
26 Table 1 shows average weekly hours of work in the two countries, for the entire economy
and  for  retail5.  Two  generalizations  emerge.  First,  Mexicans  work  longer. Mexico
unambiguously has longer weekly hours, for the economy as a whole and within retail.
Second, the cross country difference is more extreme for retail.  In the United States, retail
workers work shorter hours than others.  In Mexico, retail  workers work even longer
hours.
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27 The differences  stem from distinct  management  practices,  which in turn respond to
distinct national institutions regulating employment. In the United States, retailers use
the full-time/part-time distinction as a legally and normatively acceptable way to exclude
a large group of employees from the standard wage level and full benefit package. The
distinction has become a status distinction that may have little to do with actual hours
worked. A human resources officer at a Value Fresh noted, “There’s probably plenty of 30-
plus-hours part-time employees that just are not full-time because the stores are not able to make
anybody wholesale full-time if they want to, because of the expense of the benefit packages.” And a
part-time shift supervisor at Megamart remarked, “It’s funny because when I started this job,
I knew it was part time and I figured part time would be, you know, maybe 25, 30 hours. Pretty
much since day one, I’ve been averaging almost 40 hours.”
28 Retailers achieve the control of total labor costs through the control of labor deployment
—that is, through achieving a close coupling of worker hours with customer flow while
maintaining minimum adequate staffing levels. In the United States, where standard full-
time workweeks are 37 to 40 hours, control of total labor cost is achieved in two ways: 1)
with the use of part-time workers, some of whom who can flex up to 40 hours (and have
lower unit cost);  and 2) in some cases,  with relatively low guaranteed hours for full-
timers (32 to 35 hours) who can also flex up. As a part-time cashier at Food Chief summed
it up, “I wouldn’t mind 40 full time but they don’t do that. You can work 31 ½ Monday through
Saturday and then Sunday you can work 7 ½, so they keep you under [40 hours].” Retailers can
meet several cost-control goals this way: a close match of staffing with customer flow
over time, avoidance of the federal and state overtime premiums (which kick in at 40
hours) when hours must be flexed upward, and the ability to reduce hours to achieve
savings  at short  notice.  Labor  market  institutions  shape  this  set  of  strategies:  in
particular, the overtime premium and the legitimacy of unilateral, real-time management
decisions to alter an individual’s work hours.
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29 As a result, hours in US retail tend to be short and variable. This sets up a tension between
part-time employees who want more hours, and managers trying to keep a large crew of
part-timers on board for maximum flexibility, while minimizing the total hours budget. A
part-time cashier at Homestyle reported that the most common reason for co-workers
quitting is “they don’t get enough hours.” 
30 Unlike the case in the United States, Mexico’s institutions motivate businesses in general,
and retailers in particular, to set longer hours.  First, Mexico imposes a wage premium on
overtime, as in the United States, but the premium only takes effect at 48 hours. While
some industries have adopted a shorter workweek, the 48-hour week consisting of six 8-
hour days is the standard in formal Mexican retail. A standard 48-hour workweek raises
the average number of hours and also makes it relatively easy to cover Saturdays and
Sundays  (simply  by  staggering  six-day  schedules)  without  use  of  part-time  workers.
Second, Mexico’s minimum wage set a daily minimum at the time of the research. For jobs
that pay the minimum wage or close to it, as many retail jobs do, there was no advantage
to having workers cover just a few peak hours per day, because the employer had to pay
the daily minimum regardless of the number of hours. Indeed, contractual wage rates
have  in  general  been  set  by  the  day.  Third,  employer-provided  health  and  pension
benefits  are relatively rare in Mexico;  most  Mexicans depend on the inadequate and
uneven but nonetheless nearly universal government-provided systems (Dion 2010, Levy
2008).  Avoiding benefit  payments  is  not  a  major  consideration for  employers,  which
removes another motivation for creating part-time jobs in the United States.
31 Thus, the key incentives for businesses, and retailers in particular, to shorten hours in
the United States are absent in Mexico. Moreover, given that pay is set by the day, there
is an economic incentive for employers to press workers to work longer while paying the
contractual daily wage.  Fieldwork indicates that, in fact, retailers do save on labor costs
by extending worker hours: it appears to be common for stores to require workers to work
added hours without pay, in violation of the overtime law. Interchanges with a manager
at a Día y Noche convenience store and a clerk at a Hipermerca supermarket show two
perspectives on this:
Interviewer: How do you handle overtime? Do you pay for the extra hours, or are
they included in the regular salary?
Día y Noche manager: For a shift—that is, if someone works on their day off—we
just pay them for an extra day.
Interviewer: But if somebody has to work, for example, one more hour at the end of
a shift—does that happen sometimes?
Manager: No, no, because here every employee has their own work, so if they don’t
finish it then they have to stay and finish it up. 
***
Interviewer: And do you sometimes work some extra hours?
Hipermerca clerk: Oooh, yes, always. We never leave when we’re supposed to.
Interviewer: And do you get paid for the additional hours?
Clerk: (Laughs) No.
Interviewer: Never?
Clerk: It depends on whether…. Supposedly if they tell us they’re going to pay us
overtime, then yes. But if we stay because we choose to, or, if we have a lot of work
we have to stay because no way we can leave all that work undone.
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32 The operative conception is thus “a day’s work for a day’s pay,” even if the day’s work
takes more than eight hours. A number of workers at various retailers confirmed this
practice, with estimates ranging from “four extra hours in the average week” to “one or
two extra hours [daily].” Certainly this strategy occurs in the United States as well (see,
for example, Associated Press 2009), and Bernhardt et al. (2009) estimate that in their
sample of low-wage workers in New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago, nearly two-thirds of
grocery store  workers  who worked more than 40 hours  were not  paid the overtime
premium.  Still,  our  US  fieldwork  pointed  to  managers  seeking  to  avoid  scheduling
workers for over 40 hours, rather than making it a routine practice; no workers in our US
sample reported unpaid overtime. 
33 This line of  argument posits  that some legal  requirements bind more than others in
Mexico: employers are more likely to violate the legal requirement to pay for all hours
worked  than  the  requirement  to  pay  the  minimum  daily  wage.  This  supposition  is
certainly consistent with our retail fieldwork: there were numerous reports of unpaid
extra hours, and no reports of contractual wages below the statutory minimum. It also
makes  sense,  because there  is  a  written record of  contractual  wages  in employment
contracts and payroll records, whereas there is no built-in record-keeping of extra work
hours  in  retail  establishments.  Also  contributing to  the  incentive  to  dodge overtime
payments is a high premium of 100% (i.e., double time) up to 57 hours, and 200% beyond
that point.
34 An  interesting  indication  that  (on  average)  Mexican  businesses  press  less-powerful
employees to work longer hours, whereas US businesses impose shorter hours, emerges
from comparing the hours of nonsupervisory and supervisory workers in Table 1. In the
United States, weekly hours are longer in the category with all employees (which includes
supervisors and managers), which resonates with our own fieldwork finding that store
managers work extremely long hours (typically 55 hours or more per week), whereas, in
Mexico, weekly hours are longer for line employees than for managers.
35 There are two reasons to think that hours extension may be more extreme in Mexican
retail than in the rest of the economy. First,  Mexican chain stores are typically open
seven days a week and long hours, much like their US counterparts. Stretching out hours
is one way to cover customer flows over a service day of 12 or 14 hours.  Second, as
discussed above,  retail  unions are notorious for being particularly prone to toothless




36 Compensation is a key characteristic and important quality indicator for retail jobs. In
the broadest terms, retail wages reflect the overall productivity and standard of living of
the two countries. Thus, average hourly retail pay is $15.86 in the United States, and
Mexican pesos 20.22 (US $1.50) in Mexico in 2009 (the most recent data available)6 (US
Bureau of Labor Statistics 2012, INEGI 2010). 
37 Particularly important,  both in pay-setting differences across countries and variation
within  countries,  is  corporate  strategy.  To  illustrate  this,  we  first  examine  how
competitive strategy shapes variable pay in the US and Mexican retail sectors. Then we
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look at how market, institutional, and strategic factors come together in determining pay
hierarchies within US and Mexican stores. 
 
Variable Pay
38 Outside the terrain of electronics sales (which we consider separately below), variable pay
took the form of bonuses. In both countries, store-performance-based bonuses for store
managers (and in some cases multiple layers of store supervision) were ubiquitous. But
bonus policies for non-managerial employees ranged all over the map. 
39 In  the  US  grocery  sector,  bonuses  were  historically  limited  to  the  managerial  level.
However, one company has long provided bonuses based on store-level performance at
the hourly level,  and four others recently added them. A Homestyle district manager
commented:
One of the biggest issues that the rank and file had was, “The department manager
gets a bonus, co-managers get a bonus, store manager gets a bonus, all you folks at
corporate get a bonus. We don’t get a bonus. So we feel like we’re working for the
good of the department manager, not necessarily for the good of Homestyle.” We
listened. Hey, that’s a valid point…. So we developed this profit sharing program
and the impact has been incredible.
40 At Food Chief, where no such bonus is in effect, managers still have the discretion to give
Food Chief Bucks (store credits) to workers who have done something outstanding.  Six of
the  ten  food  retailers  offer  some  form of  variable  compensation  to  nonsupervisory
workers. 
41 At the same time, two other chains recently dropped variable pay. Megamart ended its
variable pay program in response to a wage and hour lawsuit. Freshland for several years
paid productivity bonuses—tied to cases stocked—in certain production departments. But
the experiment was dropped because of dissension from employees who did not have
access to the incentives.
42 The Mexican retail landscape in terms of variable pay to non-supervisors has one baseline
element:  Mexican  law  requires  profit-sharing  with  all  employees,  which  typically
amounts to an extra two weeks of pay per year (but obviously depends on achieving an
accounting profit). Beyond this, however, practices vary widely, including group bonuses
tied to store or chain performance, individual bonuses for perfect attendance and good
performance,  and  “employee  of  the  month”  awards.  This  scattered  set  of  practices
suggests an ongoing process of experimentation. However, a closer look at individual-
level bonuses among grocery chains points to some likely processes of organizational
learning and imitation. The chains offering performance bonuses (Bodegas López, Gusto,
ISSSTE,  and  Sabor)  are  all  based  in  centrally  located  Mexico  City.  The  chains  with
employee of the month competitions (Convenimax, Día y Noche, and Tiendas Wilson) are
all based in Monterrey, the largest city in Mexico’s North. Neighboring companies are
presumably learning from each other.
43 Commission pay  in  consumer  electronics  sales  is  a  special  case  of  variable  pay,  and
presents a striking contrast between the United States and Mexico. In the United States,
our  sample  includes  four  “pure”  electronics  retailers  (as  opposed  to  those  selling
electronics  as  part  of  a  broader set  of  merchandise lines).  Of  these,  the two big-box
chains, Electronix and Technology Source, had both dropped commissions several years
earlier. The main driver seems to have been cost reduction, especially in the context of
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shrinking margins on electronic equipment.  As an executive at  one of  the big boxes
described it:
It was great for the payroll side of the business and being able to reduce…. We
[were] throwing a lot of money at a very few individuals in our stores. The other
problem, too, was you couldn’t leverage your payroll very well. As your sales
increased, so did your payroll. (TS12)
44 He pointed to the incentive problem resulting from the abolition of commissions: “Now
[the worker is] not motivated to want to work on a Saturday…where prior, you wanted to
work  on  a  Saturday  and  Sunday.  That’s  when  you  made  your  money,  because  the
customers were there.” 
45 In Mexico, we were only able to gain access to one electronics chain, Hogartónico, but it is
one of the largest, a successful and rapidly growing enterprise. There we found that 100%
of salespeople’s income was based on “pay for contribution to sales.” When asked about
the  obligation  this  imposes  on  sales  staff,  Hogartrónico’s  head  of  training  replied,
somewhat dismissively:
We provide the marketing, products, a nice assortment, we provide all the means
they need in order to sell. What do they have to put in? Just love for the team,
affection for customer service, in order to start selling the products.
46 Thus, both US and Mexican electronics retailers structured compensation so as to keep
costs low. But the leading US electronics sellers opted for cost-cutting over direct sales
incentives  (they  used  supervision,  team-building,  and  promotion  opportunities  to
encourage sales). In Mexico, on the other hand, a leading electronics retailer found a way
to combine incentives with low cost by eliminating the base salary altogether.
 
Pay Hierarchies
47 One simple measure in which there is a striking contrast between the two countries, is
pay hierarchy within the store, measured by the store general manager’s salary divided
by the entry-level clerk salary (including any bonuses in both cases), which we were able
to calculate for most chains in both countries (10 in the US, 13 in Mexico; not all chains
provided sufficient wage and salary data). Not surprisingly, this ratio is higher for larger
stores  with  more  layers  of  management:  full-size  US  grocery  stores  (with  200-450
employees) have ratios ranging from 4.3-5.4, whereas the two small format chains (20-40
workers) in our US sample both have ratios of 2.8.  But in Mexico, the two chains of full-
size grocers for which we have information both fall at the lower end of the large size
category  (about  200  employees),  but  have  much  higher  ratios,  of  11.0  and  29.2!
Confirming the contrast, smaller Mexican grocery chains (6-60 workers per store) show
ratios of 3.3-3.8 (with the exception of Convenimax, to be discussed below), well above the
US ratio of 2.8.
48 The difference seems to reflect the overall higher level of inequality and hierarchy in
Mexican society. In Tiendas Wilson, which has the staggering top-to-bottom ratio of 29.2,
the largest portion of the gap occurs at the level of department heads (the lowest level of
management),  who earn 5.4 times as much as a full-time clerk—whereas in large US
grocery stores this ratio ranges from 1.1-1.6. 
49 But variations within each country are as revealing as the gaping difference between
them. For example, unions evidently make a difference. Comparing the two large-format
Mexican grocers, the lower management to clerk ratio of 11.0 is at ISSSTE, where there is
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a formidable union. At Tiendas Wilson, where HR officials commented, “We have a union-
free  life…even  though  there’s  a  union” because  the  union does  not  get  involved in  any
management decisions,  the ratio is  nearly three times as large—and the pay ratio of
department  head to  clerk  in  particular  is  exactly  three  times  as  large  as  at  ISSSTE.
Similarly  in  the  US,  comparing non-union Homestyle  and unionized Food Chief,  two
otherwise similar chains, we find that Homestyle has a larger ratio of 5.4 compared to 4.9,
but even more revealingly, Food Chief has a much larger gap between full-time and part-
time clerks  (full-timers  are the core of  union membership),  but  a much smaller  gap
between full-time clerks and managers.
50 Corporate strategy, and in particular the effect of ownership structure, also enters into
the determination of these hierarchies. Convenimax is the one smaller-format Mexican
grocery chain where the manager-to-clerk ratio falls outside the neighborhood of 3.5: its
ratio is 2.0 in franchised stores and 2.5 in company-operated stores. Clearly Convenimax
management is marching to a different drummer; one possible reason is that the chain is
US-owned. Also, we have wage information on one Mexican chain with mid-sized stores
(about  100  employees),  Gusto,  which  has  a  ratio  of  2.6,  lower  than  all  the  Mexican
companies except Convenimax.  Possible reasons for  this  outlier  include the fact  that
Gusto  is  a  small  family-owned  firm  in  the  process  of  implementing  more  formal
management  systems,  and  that  it  is  based  in  a  sparsely  populated  state  with  little
presence  of  the  large  chains.  Thus,  country-level  differences,  the  degree  to  which
institutions  shape  salaries,  and  company-level  discretion  all  affect  within-store  pay
inequalities.
 
Job Ladders and Mobility
51 Retail chains in both countries follow similar strategies regarding promotion ladders and
tradeoffs between promoting from within and hiring from outside. However, significant
differences in norms regarding gender roles and reproductive sphere institutions result
in somewhat different trajectories for Mexican and US women retail workers, as well as
slightly different patterns of gender differences.
52 Before delving into similarities and differences in mobility trajectories for retail workers,
it is worth noting two contrasts that are important parts of the context for mobility in the
two countries. First, the general level of education is far lower in Mexico than in the US
and  workers  with  any  post-secondary  education  are  considered  part  of  the  socio-
economic elite. Over 51% of the working age population (age 15+) does not have a high
school diploma and only 17% has a college degree7.
53 Also, formal sector jobs are far less available, even for workers with education. Retail jobs
are considered appropriate for educated workers relative to other options. This pattern
holds even given the caveats that jobs in retail are considered somewhat low pay and
that,  ultimately,  most  workers  with education aspire  to  run their  own business,  not
remain employed in a chain.
54 Second, and of less importance in this cross country comparison, the lowest position in
chains— bagger—is not a waged position In Mexico. Baggers —usually school age youths—
work exclusively for tips. In the US, the job is often held by youths as well but is waged
and is  a  common first  step  into  retail  job  ladders.  Similarly,  uniformed parking  lot
assistants (directing motorists), a non-existent position in the US, work exclusively for
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55 Turnover for entry-level workers is high in both countries, a hallmark of retail work. It is
primarily due to quits, rather than firings, also a common pattern. Among entry-level
workers,  turnover is  high among young workers overall,  in both countries.  It  is  also
triggered by workers seeking higher pay (in Mexico) or longer work hours (US part-time
workers).  In  Mexico,  women  quit  due  to  family  responsibilities  (see  below).  Among
Mexican higher level  workers,  turnover is  due,  in addition to seeking higher pay,  to
setting out to run a business on their own (sometimes managing a franchise store), and to
moves and migration, while among their US counterparts, it is more likely triggered by
the desire for easier work schedules (less weekend and night work).
56 Where US managers occasionally mentioned advantages of turnover such as keeping a lid
on wage growth through seniority or implementing reorganizations of work processes
without friction or inertia, we saw only rare instances of this view in Mexico manager
interviews. Mexican managers saw turnover rates above 25% as a liability and as eroding
the  ability  of  the  business  to  operate efficiently.  Manager  statements  illustrate  the
contrast. An assistant manager at The Market, a US grocery chain, stated, “High turnover
can  sort  of  give  managers  a  chance  to  somewhat  start  anew.”  A  Food Chief  regional  HR
manager put it more bluntly: “We like turnover because it keeps our average hourly rate down.”
57 In contrast, a Mexican manager commented on the disadvantages of turnover and his
company’s orientation to keeping workers, uttering words we heard in other interviews: "
Of course turnover is a problem. There's healthy turnover and there's turnover that gives you
trouble. It means doing it all over again--training and hiring--and all that costs money. Our main
challenge is to retain our people. Here they're valued, so we have to take care of them." 
58 In spite of this apparent difference, turnover is on the whole higher in Mexican food
chains in particular than in US ones. (There is only one electronics chain in the Mexican
sample making comparison of turnover in this sub-sector impossible.) Perhaps it is this
high turnover that generates managers’ greater focus on retention. In food chains for
which  information  was  available  average  turnover  was  100%  (as  high  as  113%  if
government owned ISSSTE is excluded). This level of turnover is substantially higher than
the average in the US study sample (mean 53.4%).
59 Beyond averages, there is cross firm variation in both countries. Entry-level turnover
ranged widely across Mexican firms, from 1% yearly (in ISSSTE) to 230% in chains, and
from zero to 80% in single store retailers. The availability of other (formal) employment
options affected turnover rates directly, according to Mexican managers. For example, a
Hipermerca manager noted: “Turnover has stopped [because] the shoe industry is in recession;
those are businesses that offer much more manageable hours.” Respondents at Gusto noted
that turnover had been halved from a high of 60-80% after maquiladoras relocated away.
Cross-firm variation is evident in the US as well but the range of variation in the study
sample was far narrower, 40-80% in food retail8 and 68-80% in consumer electronics.
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Similar Strategies for Manager Hiring - Promotion from Within but with Recent
Changes
60 In both countries, the broad pattern of promotion has historically been to promote from
within. Interviewed US companies reported fairly high rates of manager promotion from
within  —in parallel  to  the  high turnover  model  for  entry-level  workers.  Food chain
respondents  estimated  that  60-90% of  upper  level  hourly  jobs  as  well  as  store  level
management were filled from within while electronics chains reported rates of 50%.
61 While Mexican chains also promote from within, Mexican workers with formal education
take jobs in retail more readily than in the US. They are considered for promotion ahead
of those who started in entry-level positions and who have a low education level (junior
high).
62 At Convenimax, a US owned convenience store chain, 90% of managers started in lower
positions and were promoted from within; so were 30-40% of supervisors and 60% of
district  managers.  Promotion from within is  seen as a means to ensure that there is
congruence of practice and adherence to company “spirit” across franchises. If the job of
the manager is to open new franchises, it is desirable to have someone promoted from
within, who is dedicated to the company. At a supermarket chain, a frontline worker
estimated that 70-80% assistant managers were promoted from within.
63 This average reliance on promotion from within also encompasses significant variation
between and within firms. For example, estimates from various interviewees ranged from
one third of store managers to none promoted from within at Día y Noche but were as
high  as  66%  in  one  region  at  Hipermerca.  Also,  mid-level  managers  (department
managers and supervisors) are far more likely to be promoted from within than general
managers, a pattern shared with US retailers. 
64 Even while mobility from within still distinguishes retail from other industries, recent
changes in practices include increasing hiring from outside. Modern retailers in both
countries have tapped increased availability of college-educated workers to hire for mid-
level and higher level managers. In the United States, educational requirements for retail
positions are higher than in Mexico (for example, a 4-year college degree for assistant
store manager as compared to a two-year degree in Mexico), but the patterns are similar.
At Convenimax, the Manager of Franchising noted that competitor 7-11 started raising
the  education  level  of  some  managers,  and  expected  Covenimax  to  follow  suit.  For
example,  several  years  earlier  the  chain  had  started  hiring  regional  managers  with
technical degrees. At ISSSTE, the government owned food chain, very few managers come
from within because internal candidates “do not have the education level required.” 
 
Mobility and Gender Differences
65 While retail job ladders and hiring patterns look roughly similar across the two countries,
gender differentiation of mobility patterns is more marked in Mexico than in the US. 
66 In both countries, broad patterns of gender typing operate. On the whole, men are more
likely to be over-represented in management ranks (and rise faster) and, within these, in
the higher echelons.  Mexican men were able to parlay promotions achieved in small
business to similar positions in retail chains. Taking these similar patterns into account,
we  find  that  Mexican  women  workers  have  work  patterns  more marked  by  their
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reproductive roles than US women. In the US, the gender differences appear to be ones of
kind of job and degree of career achievement. In Mexico, in addition to a similar job gap,
women are much more likely to withdraw from formal work during family formation and
child bearing years.
67 This difference reflects both Mexico’s gender hierarchy and its reproductive institutions.
Mexico has much more clearly demarcated gender roles, with women expected to have
primary responsibility as family caregiver, particularly in the raising of children. Related
to  these  gender roles  and  further  reinforcing  them,  child  care  availability  and
affordability are limited, making it difficult to hold a job while raising young children. For
example, by law, formal workers can access publicly funded child care but, in reality,
child care availability is limited and unevenly accessible across the country. Social forces
steering  women  toward  a  full-time  parenting  role  are  further  reinforced  by  the
prevalence of full-time schedules in formal sector retailers.  Where US women workers
might  adapt  to  limited  child  care  by  working  part-time—while  suffering  significant
immediate  economic  costs  and  longer  term  negative  career  consequences—Mexican
women leave the workforce altogether because short hours are not an option in formal
retail, except in a few multinational retailers who can afford to pay an effective hourly
rate well above the minimum wage.
68 As a result,  we find two different trajectories for Mexican women. First,  women with
higher education are hired at mid-level or higher level manager positions which they
seem to maintain with some interruption for child bearing but with options for child care
later.  Second,  women hired  in  entry-level  positions  face  two  levels  of  challenges  to
mobility: they experience career interruptions from withdrawal from the labor force; and
those with continuous work histories are hindered by education requirements for mid-
level positions.
69 The career interruptions are quite significant. Those who worked while raising children
reported “family difficulties” as the reason for leaving positions over time. Similarly,
managers alluded to family difficulties that triggered turnover. Commenting on sources
of turnover, the HR manager at one Tiendas Wilson store said “recently we’ve had a series
with family problems “. The HR head at another Wilson store listed “married women who
don’t  have  anyone  to  take  care  of  their  children  and  family  problems”  as  causes  for
turnover.Longitudinal study interviews –for women who are older and in lower level
positions—likewise indicate stretches of time entirely dedicated to child rearing or, at
least, to avoiding formal sector work. 
70 The US study did not gather detailed career histories but did gather some work histories
as well as interview part-time workers (mostly cashiers). For part-time workers and for
those  who  recount  shifting  back  to  part-time  from  a  full-time  schedule,  family
responsibilities figured significantly. Workers reported working part-time due to the care
of young children and the need to reduce hours during school holidays. Given the limited
availability of affordable child care, two parents may work alternating shifts in order to
avoid having to use non-family child care at all and single parents find that the only way
to watch over school children is to work part-time. (Elder care responsibilities also played
a role in part-time work.)
71 In the United States, day-time, steady, part-time schedules were filled by women with
family responsibilities.  These women did not turn over much. The accommodation of
family that the job provides came with a cost: low pay, and small chances of moving up
due to the accumulated years in entry-level  positions.  These women,  however,  could
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shuttle back and forth between short-hour part-time and time-adjuster status (seeking
and waiting for full-time) when family responsibilities lightened.
72 In  addition,  promotion paths  were  open for  US  women in  entry-level  positions.  For
example, cashiers with a steady work record could be promoted to shift supervisor, and
eventually “front end” supervisor (who covers cashiers, customer service desk, and a few
other functions). This promotion path was peopled primarily by women. It is much less
certain that front end supervisors could migrate to supervisory positions in other sectors
of stores. However, in chains with smaller stores, those hired as cashier (a multi task job
that  also  entails  being a  floor  clerk)  could  eventually  manage a  store.  Beyond store
manager, however, women were thinly represented. In sampled grocery chains, we did
not encounter a female regional manager. US women workers beyond entry level and




73 We inquired about the role of institutional differences, if any, in job outcomes in Mexican
and US retail. Institutional differences indeed come into play. Exactly how and to what
degree they do so, however, varies depending upon the particular job characteristics of
concern. In some dimensions of job quality,  within-country cross-firm differences are
more salient for job outcomes than cross-national contrasts. That is, there is room for
firm discretion within given national contexts. Furthermore, we note that where they
have impacts on job outcomes, institutional effects may be direct (as with a minimum
wage law) or indirect (as with an institution affecting labor supply characteristics). We
elaborate these patterns below, focusing on the main dimensions of job quality.
 
Hours of Work
74 Regarding work hours,  differences  in labor  market  institutions  have the most  direct
effects even while modern retailers in both countries operate with long hours and 7-day
operation. The most salient contrast is that Mexico has higher average hours and low use
of part-for most entry-level jobs while US retail has a high rate of part-time as well as
lower  average  hours.  We  attribute  these  patterns  to  key  features  of  employment
regulation and social protection mechanisms in each country. Most important are the
fact that in Mexico,  the minimum wage and contractual wages were (until  late 2012)
based on the work day (rather than hourly), on one hand, and the employer based benefit
provision system in the US which has built in incentives to use part-time, on the other
hand. 
75 In the two countries,  incentives run in opposite  directions regarding work hours.  In
Mexico, the weekly overtime threshold of 48 hours, combined (until late 2012 when it was
revoked)  with  the  day-based  minimum  wage,  discourage  creation  of  part-time  jobs,
particularly for jobs close to the minimum wage level.  The day-based wage also had a
built-in incentive to extend unpaid hours, a practice that is feasible in an environment of
limited enforcement and weak unions. Both of these processes led to high average hours.
In the US, in contrast, the overtime threshold of 40 hours is enforced on the whole, and,
combined with the benefit  cost  differential  between full-time and part-time workers,
"So Far From God, so Close to the United States", and yet…: Unexpected Differ...
Revue Interventions économiques, 47 | 2013
17
yields incentives to use part-time as well as to keep hours at or below 40 hours for both
full-time and part-time workers.
 
Pay Hierarchies and Variable Pay
76 The major  institutional  contrast  between the  countries  that  affects  pay  hierarchy  is
greater societal acceptance of hierarchy in Mexico than the US. We found greater gaps
between  managers’  and  wage  workers’  pay  in  Mexican  retailers  than  in  the  US;
interestingly, in some companies the gap was greatest between department heads (first
level  of  management)  and  entry-level  workers  suggesting  high  tolerance  for  pay
differentiation  indeed.  Similarly,  where  commission  pay  was  used  (in  electronics),
Mexican retailer Hogartrónico used 100 % commission pay thus exposing sales staff to
considerable fluctuation in earnings.  In contrast,  US electronics retailers,  having lost
control of the costs of partial commission pay, had reverted to 100% base salaries for sales
staff thus reducing labor costs but also eliminating large differences among workers.
77 But company discretion also plays a role in pay hierarchy. There were differences due to
size,  with  large  stores  having  greater  hierarchy  in  both  countries.  There  were  also
differences due to ownership type. Family-owned chain Gusto and government-owned
ISSSTE were able to implement more equal within-store wage distributions than their
counterparts, presumably in part because they are sheltered from some of the financial
market pressures to which other chains must respond. US-owned Convenimax also shows
a different  within-store wage distribution than its  Mexican-owned convenience store
counterparts.  This US-owned chain was presumably less susceptible to societal norms
regarding  hierarchy.  There  also  were  indications  that  unionized  retailers  (Mexico’s
ISSSTE and US Food Chief) had more compressed pay structures. 
78 Regarding variable pay practices, we find that there are greater within-country, cross-
company,  contrasts  than cross-national  differences  illustrating a  fair  amount  of  firm
discretion  in  this  matter.  While  store  performance  based  managerial  bonuses  are
common practice in both countries,  retailers  differ significantly within-country as  to
their  bonus  practices  for  non-managerial  employees.   Retailers  in  both  countries
experimented with different types of pay, mixing forms of commission or bonus with
base pay. There was variation over time for some retailers, indicating a fair amount of
experimentation,  thus  making  it  difficult  to  discern  reliable  patterns.  Also,  within
country variation might reflect joint experimentation. For example in Mexico, there were
shared  practices  among  firms  in  close  proximity  (and  a  concomitant  contrast  with
practices of retailers across regions) pointing to the geographic diffusion of learning.
 
Mobility and Turnover
79 Modern  retailers  structure  job  ladders  similarly  in  the  two  countries;  we  find  little
difference and none that could specifically be attributed to national institutional settings.
Of course, education requirements for particular job grades are higher on average in the
US, reflecting the greater prevalence of secondary and post-secondary education in the
population relative to the situation in Mexico. Also, retailers in both countries have relied
on recruitment from within to populate the ranks of supervisors, store management and
even regional management. In recent years, retailers in both countries have displayed a
tendency toward more “lateral” recruiting (recruiting from outside) than in the past.
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80 Turnover is high in retail in both countries but we do find differences in the reasons for
turnover that  are attributable to national  differences.  Turnover levels appear to vary
within country and across retailers and are driven by practices at the firm level.
81 Even with similar job ladders, significant cross-national differences in gender roles in the
family  and  in  interactions  with  the  education  and  labor  market  spheres  indeed  are
reflected in mobility  and turnover  patterns  for  men and women in each of  the two
countries. Mexican women are more circumscribed in their role than US women workers.
 So  even  while  there  is  gender-based  stratification  in  US  retailers,  it  appears  less
pronounced than in Mexico. Thus, societal institutions beyond those regulating the labor
market operate in concert to have an indirect effect on jobs and contribute to shaping
distinct outcomes in the two countries. 
82 Higher levels of education, particularly post-secondary education, are less accessible to
women in Mexico; they are expected to become the primary family caretaker. We noted a
two-tier  pattern  to  women’s  paths  in  Mexican  retail.  On  one  hand,  women  with
professional and academic post-secondary degrees access retail jobs “from the outside,”
being hired in at higher levels. Women in these positions are either young and without
children  or  purchase  caregiving  in  order  to  hold  full-time  jobs  (thus  adhering  to  a
different norm).  On the other hand, women hired in entry-level positions experience
limited promotion opportunities due to low levels of educational attainment as well as
truncated careers due to multiple interruptions caused by responsibility for family care.
Family caregiving—and difficulty with accessing child care—were often noted as a reason
for quits (causing turnover). The fact that Mexican retailers create few part-time jobs
contributes to this pattern. Full-time work is difficult to handle for entry-level workers
with  family  care  responsibilities,  particularly  when transportation  is  problematic.  In
these ways, socially constructed gender roles operate early in life and throughout the
work career, thus shaping women’s trajectories in retail.
83 Without being free of the pressures of gender-based job stratification, US women retail
workers,  particularly  entry-level  workers,  resolve  the  immediate  difficulties  of  care
giving caused by lack of affordable child care and sparse paid family leave by relying on
part-time work, thus remaining connected to jobs (albeit with low earnings and scant
benefits) over time. Also, there is more widespread acceptance of women’s work outside
the home and of the use of non-family child care, even while the child care system is
patchy.  Without  arguing that  non-benefitted  part-time retail  jobs  are  in  some sense
“good” for US women, we do find that gender role norms are not quite as constraining to
job mobility for US women in retail. Entry-level women workers are better able to move
up to supervisory positions and store management.
84 In brief, nation-specific institutional effects such as we have described typically interact
with  corporate  strategy.  Companies  react  resourcefully  to  each  set  of  institutional
constraints,  and those reactions themselves  compound the initial  differences.  So,  for
example, in terms of hours of work and electronics commission sales, US retailers lean
toward cost-minimizing solutions (while of course seeking to ensure adequate effort),
whereas  Mexican  retailers  lean  toward  worker-effort-maximizing  solutions  (while  of
course seeking to contain costs). 
85 Beyond  the  national  patterns  of  institutional  frameworks  and  typical  corporate
responses, we also found variation within each country. Some of that variation has to do
with regional differences in labor demand and regional level institutions, dimensions we
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did not explore in this paper. But there is also space for businesses to come up with varied
solutions to the same basic problem as we have just demonstrated. 
 
Conclusion
86 We posed three questions about retail jobs in the United States and Mexico: To what
extent can we explain broad-cross national differences in retail jobs with institutional
differences?  Which  institutions  seem  to  be  most  important  in  explaining  which
differences? And within the parameters set by institutional and market differences, how
much discretion is left for companies to adopt different policies and practices? 
87 We sought to limit extraneous variation by restricting our attention to similar businesses:
large chains, primarily in groceries and consumer electronics. Nevertheless, even within
this restricted universe,  we did find that national institutions —both legal  and social
norms— have  discernible  imprints  on the  characteristics  of  retail jobs.  The  simplest
instances are cases where institutions act directly on employment as is the case with
hours of work outcomes. But indirect institutional effects are also important, particularly
involving institutions that surround the reproduction of labor such as child care systems
and norms regarding mothers’ role in child rearing.  At the same time, institutions are far
from an iron cage: we find ample room for managerial discretion and experimentation in
both countries’ retail sectors.
88 These  findings  have  implications  for  broader  analysis  and  theorization  of  unequal
employment outcomes, and for public policy. On the analytical side, these results bolster
the argument that national institutions remain highly important in shaping workplaces
even in conditions of globalization of production models and ownership. They highlight
the less visible role of reproductive institutions, especially in a sector like retail with a
disproportionate concentration of women as is true of many service sectors. And they
flag the impact of strategic behavior by firms in determining final employment outcomes.
These analytical conclusions also translate into insights on the policy side. Understanding
the continuing weight of institutions remind us that public policy gives us important
levers to affect job quality—including a broader menu of possibilities beyond what’s in
place in any given country. At the same time, our findings make the cautionary point that
institutions can have major unintended and unexpected consequences (widespread part-
time work in the US and unpaid work hours in Mexico were certainly not envisioned by
those  designing  the  policies  that  motivate  them).  This  comparative  glimpse  at  one
particular type of job in two particular countries suggests the rich possibilities for further
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NOTES
1.  The following draws upon Askenazy et al. 2012.
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2.  With  varied  degrees  of  comprehensiveness,  US  retail  chains  in  the  sample  provided  HR
indicators such as: the distribution of employment by main job categories; the full-time/part-
time breakdown;  the demographic  composition of  the work force;  pay scales  (minimum and
maximum for each pay category); turnover rates; and the percent of store level and higher level
management hired from within.   Retail  chains varied greatly in their  ability  to provide time
trends for these indicators. With similar variation, they also provided information about benefit
plans and eligibility rules for these, as well as descriptions of their training programs. The text of
collective bargaining agreements, where applicable, was obtained either from the company itself
or from the union local.
3.  The study also includes a chain of mid-sized clothing stores, family-owned food and clothing
stores, one public market stand, and one stand at a tianguis, an open air market that operates in
different locations each day of the week. 
4.  At the time of revision of this article,  November 14, 2012, the Mexican Congress had just
passed a labor law reform including an hourly minimum wage; it was expected that the President
would sign the legislation into law.
5.  For a more extended discussion of retail hours levels and trends in the United States, Mexico,
and Canada, see Carré and Tilly 2012.
6.  US figure is the median for all workers, 2011 annual average. Median for hourly employees
alone is $13.51.
7.  Source for education: INEGI, Censo de Población y Vivienda 2010: Tabulados del Cuestionario
Básico, created 2/2011
8.  The one exception was a food retailer with a low turnover of 20% that retains workers by
exceeding prevailing wages and benefits.
ABSTRACTS
Modern retail chains generate large quantities of entry-level jobs, many of which are low-wage,
in Mexico as in the United States. The sector’s employment patterns and practices make up an
important strand among processes that generate and reproduce economy-wide inequality. Retail
trade jobs also are emblematic of service work as a whole. With a cross-national comparative
study, the paper explores the role of work-related and non-work related societal institutions and
norms in affecting retail job quality. The paper compares the processes that shape modern retail
jobs in the two countries relying upon sectorial field work conducted over the past nine years.
Three  dimensions  of  job  quality  are  points  of  comparison:  hours  of  work;  compensation
structure; and job mobility. The paper finds that national institutions have discernible imprints
on  the  characteristics  of  retail  jobs.  The  simplest  instances  are  cases  where  institutions  act
directly on employment as occurs with hours of work outcomes. But indirect institutional effects
are also important, particularly involving reproductive institutions such as child care systems
and norms regarding mothers’ role in child rearing.  Still, ample room for managerial discretion
and experimentation is found in both countries’ retail sectors.
La grande distribution moderne a créé une quantité importante d’emplois de premier échelon,
dont beaucoup sont à bas salaire, au Mexique comme aux États-Unis d’Amérique.  Les structures
et pratiques d’emploi du secteur composent des données importantes des processus qui créent et
reproduisent les inégalités dans une économie. Grace à une étude internationale comparative,
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l’article explore le rôle des institutions et normes sociétales (liées et non-liées au travail) dans le
domaine de la qualité des emplois. L’article compare les processus qui forment les emplois dans
la grande distribution moderne de ces deux pays et s’appuie sur des études de terrain conduites
durant les  neuf  dernières  années.  Les  points  de comparaison sont les  trois  dimensions de la
qualité d’emploi : les heures de travail; les structures de rémunération; et la mobilité interne et
externe. L’article montre que les institutions ont une empreinte visible sur les caractéristiques
d’emploi  dans  la  grande distribution.  Les  instances  les  plus  simples  consistent  de  cas  où les
institutions  jouent  directement  sur  l’emploi  comme  peut  se  voir  avec  les  heures  de  travail.
Cependant,  les  effets  institutionnels  indirects  importent  aussi,  particulièrement  ceux  qui
concernent les institutions de reproduction de la force de travail, telles que les systèmes de garde
d’enfant ou les normes liées au rôle maternel dans l’éducation des enfants. Néanmoins, il reste
encore  une  marge  de  manœuvre  ample  pour  les  choix  et  l’expérimentation  de  la  part  des
managers de la grande distribution des deux pays.
INDEX
Keywords: entry-level jobs, job quality, labor market, Mexico, part-time work, retail sector,
societal effects
Mots-clés: effet sociétal, emplois de premier échelon, grande distribution, marché du travail,
Mexique, qualité de l’emploi, travail à temps partiel
AUTHORS
FRANÇOISE CARRÉ
Center for Social Policy, University of Massachusetts Boston Francoise.Carre@umb.edu
CHRIS TILLY
Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, UCLA Ctilly@irle.ucla.edu
"So Far From God, so Close to the United States", and yet…: Unexpected Differ...
Revue Interventions économiques, 47 | 2013
25
